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Zimmerman: Mass Settlement Rivalries

MASS SETTLEMENT RIVALRIES
Adam S. Zimmerman*
Private attorneys in class actions and civil bankruptcies increasingly
compete with federalprosecutors,agencies, and state attorneys general,
for the same funds, from the same defendant, for the same harm, and
often, on behalf of the same groups of people. To some, government
attorneys offer less expensive and more accountable representationfor
victims of widely disbursed harm. To others, politically insulated
private attorneys in class actions and bankruptcies offer more effective
representationfor parties. But few have examined the dynamic way
public and private settlements impact each other when they are
implemented at the same time.
This Article argues that dueling public and private settlements offer
several potential advantages-includingmore efficient representation,
more oversight, and more complete forms of compensation to different
subgroups of victims. In their current form, however, settlement
rivalries can fall short of these goals. Among other things, rival
settlements: (1) may duplicate cases proceeding on separate tracks
without coordinatedjudicial oversight; (2) introduce new uncertainty
into litigationfinancing by unpredictablyaffecting the number of victims
who ultimately participate in a class settlement, and accordingly, the
fees that private attorneys recover; and (3) confuse unrepresented
victims with separate, rival settlement offers. In this way, these new
settlement rivalries share some of the same advantages and
disadvantages once presented by rival class action settlements, where
attorneys for putative class members competed in different courts to
certify class actionsfor overlappinggroups ofpeople.
Accordingly, this Article recommends three reforms that tap settlement
rivalries'potentialbenefits. First, courts shouldformally or informally
coordinate review over duelingpublic and private settlements. Second,
courts should streamline notice and opt-out provisions to reduce victim
confusion and unintendedwaivers of rights. Third, government lawyers
should adopt the distributionguidelines proposed by the American Law
Institute to consistently balance victims' competing interests and reduce
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I owe deep thanks to the
insightful comments of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Robert Rabin, Alison Frankel, Maggie Lemos, David
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1. INTRODUCTION

Just as the last decade saw the collapse of "global settlements"-allencompassing agreements that, once and for all, resolved thousands of
claims against one defendant-the next must contend with the rise of
"4mass settlement rivalries." In a mass settlement rivalry, private and
public lawyers jockey to compensate groups of victims with funds from
the same wrongdoer. Consider the following examples:
" A year after private attorneys commenced class actions against
the nation's largest banks alleging they defr~auded non-profits in a
complex bid-rigging scheme, federal agencies and state attorneys
general settled with the same defendants, establishing a large
settlement fund for the same set of victims. Private attorneys
argued that the government fund "hijacked" their own settlement
efforts: "[tlhat's what happens when you have two different
processes .. , the defendant can pick door number one or door
2
number two."
* After Scott Rothstein's Ponzi scheme collapsed in October 2009,
1. See, e.g., Howard Erichson & Benjamin Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265, 267 (2011) ("Ever since the Supreme Court rejected a pair of asbestos settlement class actions
in the late 1990s ... mass tort lawyers largely abandoned any hope that settlement class actions would
be the key to finding closure.").
2. Nate Raymond, Plaintiffs Lawyers in Muni Bond Derivative MIDL Object to UBS BidRigging Settlement, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (May 11, 2011). Government attomneys, by contrast,
argued the class action frustrated state sovereign interests and suffered from conflicts of interest. Nate
Raymond, NY AG Office to Plaintiffs Lawyers: Stay Out of Our Bid-Rigging Cases, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER (May 12, 2011).
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federal agents seized tens of millions of dollars of his assetsincluding exotic cars, over twenty properties, and fifteen million
illicitly wired to Morocco. But after creditors filed a petition
against Rothstein in bankruptcy to recover their losses, federal
authorities sold the same contested assets in a separate criminal
proceeding, dividing the proceeds among a different set of
victims. 3
Shortly after Computer Associates Technologies, Inc. (Computer
Associates) settled a class action that alleged the company
unlawfully inflated its quarterly earnings reports, Computer
Associates reached an agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office
to establish a $225 million restitution fund to compensate
shareholders injured by the scandal.4
Rival compensatory settlements reflect a new development among
government attorneys and private lawyers. Historically, plaintiff class
counsel worked in tandem with prosecutors and regulators to
supplement law enforcement efforts, while compensating large groups
of victims.5 But as public officials were encouraged by federal and state
legislatures to aggressively seek victim compensation, they increasingly
found themselves competing with private attorneys in class actions and
civil bankruptcies to compensate the same group of people-oftentimes
in different jurisdictions, according to different legal standards, and
subject to different degrees of judicial scrutiny.
Some commentators-including myself 6 -have highlighted the
comparative benefits that government attorneys and private lawyers
offer in this growing rivalry over mass compensation.7 But relatively
3. Jordan D. Maglich, While Rothstein Victims Wait, Appellate Court Hears Argument Over
(Jan.
7,
2013,
8:47
PM),
Forfeited Assets,
PONZITRACKER
Entitlement
To
http://www.ponzitracker.com/main/2013/1/7/while-rothstein-victims-wait-appellate-court-hearsargument.html. See also Caitlin F. Saladrigas, CorporateCriminalLiability: Lessonsfrom the Rothstein
Debacle, 66 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 435 (2012). The Eleventh Circuit recently reversed the district court
decision to permit the government seizure and distribution, concluding that the government should not
have forfeited Rothstein's assets. See In re Rothstein, 2013 WL 2494980 (11th Cir. June 12, 2013).
4. United States v. Computer Assocs., Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Sept. 22, 2004),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/ca/usca904defpagr.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco,
and the Mixing of Public and PrivateLawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 17, 35
(2000).
6. Adam S. Zimmerman, DistributingJustice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011) (tracing the rise of
federal agency based settlement funds, which collected over $10 billion over the past decade); Adam S.
Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011); Michael D.
Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2012).
7. See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63
Bus. LAW. 317, 345-46 (2008) (concluding that the SEC's new role in providing investor compensation
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few have examined the dynamic effect that overlapping public and
private compensation schemes have on each other. Dueling public and
private settlements, in theory, offer some advantages over a single large
settlement, including more efficient representation, more authority to
collect information and funds, more oversight over mass settlements,
and more complete forms of compensation to different subgroups of
victims.8 In their current form, however, public and private settlement
rivalries may fall short of this ideal, compromising fair and efficient
representation and compensation.
To be sure, compensation is not the only goal of mass litigation. In
some areas of law-like securities and consumer protection law-many
argue that the primary function of large-scale litigation is to deter bad
behavior, not to compensate injured parties.9 In such cases, rival
settlements also may frustrate goals of optimal deterrence.' 0 For
in securities fraud cases unnecessarily duplicates private securities fraud class actions); Verity Winship,
FairFunds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1134-41 (2008)
(proposing a framework for the SEC to determine whether to use its power to create a victims'
compensation scheme when private and public actions are available); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate
Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486
(2012); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 623 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens
PatriaeSuits andIntervention, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1919, 1922 (2000).
9. For representative articles that challenge compensatory goals in securities class actions, see,
e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming SecuritiesLitigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between
Public and PrivateEnforcement ofRule 1Ob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1312-15 (2008) ("Rule 1Ob5 class actions fail to provide meaningful compensation to the class members on whose behalf they are
brought."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) ("From a compensatory perspective, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly."); Janet Cooper
Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1507 (1996)
(observing that, in securities cases, "[tihe compensation rationale does not persuasively justify the
present measure of damages."); but see James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108
MICH. L. REV. 323, 340-42 (2009) (noting the limitations of some arguments, like diversification, to
real securities fraud losses). For similar critiques that challenge the compensatory objectives of smallclaim, consumer class actions, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2008) ("But small-stakes class actions serve no insurance function. Rather, the
only function they serve is deterrence."); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2006)
("In reality, there is generally no legitimate utilitarian reason to care whether class members with small
claims get compensated at all. Nor is there any economic reason to fret that entrepreneurial plaintiffs'
lawyers are being overcompensated.").
10. Indeed, multiple layers of public enforcement may also complicate deterrence. See, e.g.,
Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013) (describing lack of
coordination among executive agencies and recommending coordinated enforcement through White
House intervention); Amanda M. Rose, The Multi-EnforcerApproach to Securities FraudDeterrence:A
CriticalAnalysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010) (describing costs to optimal deterrence when multiple
enforcers-the SEC, state regulators, and private attorneys general-participate in securities regulation).
But see Urska Velikonja, Public Compensationfor Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC's FairFund
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV _ (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 59), available at
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defendants, rival public and private settlements add to the cost of
enforcement or may overly deter. For plaintiffs, the undefined threat of
rival compensatory settlements may mean under-deterrenceweakening incentives for private attorneys to invest in valid class
actions out of a fear that, at some undefined point in time, government
attorneys will "hijack" their lawsuit with the same offer of relief for
victims.
This Article takes a different tack. I take the settlements on their own
terms and assume compensation remains an important objective. Many
mass settlements still offer very substantial awards to victims.
Moreover, class action settlements and public officials increasingly
devote substantial resources to compensating victims, even when the
stakes are relatively small. Accordingly, in this Article, I instead ask
whether settlement rivalries between public and private actors further or
frustrate their express goals of compensatory justice.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explores the features of
mass settlement rivalries in major national settlements. In many cases,
just as private lawyers tried to settle large claims for compensation with
defendants, a public actor chose to settle similar claims of wrongdoing.
Public attorneys' increasing competition with private attorneys to
compensate victims reflects two distinct developments in public law.
First, as victims' rights advocates successfully moved public law
institutions toward "a more victim-centered justice system,"" federal
and state officials have been encouraged-and sometimes required-to
seek victim compensation. 12 Second, large corporate scandals prompted
actors in the executive branch-the Department of Justice (DOJ),13
http://ssm.com/abstract-2400189 (arguing that when individuals pay out-of-pocket to settle with the
SEC the result "increases the deterrence of the SEC's enforcement and reduces the circularity of its
compensation.").
11. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 6. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, for
example, was hailed as part of a move "toward a more victim-centered justice system," which would
help transform a criminal justice system that Congress believed was ignoring the plight of victims.
Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay: A CriticalAssessment of the Mandatory Restitution Act of 1996,
97 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1688-89 (2009).
12. See, e.g., A Bill to Providefor Restitution of Victims of Crimes, and for Other Purposes:
Hearing on S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. H1302, H1306 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Foley) ("For far too
long we have forgotten the innocent victims of crime.").
13. See, e.g., Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of
at
2
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
U.S.
Attorneys,
at
Dep't
Components,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_pri
vwaiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf ("Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to
address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent,
discover, and punish white collar crime."); FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N POLICY STATEMENT ON
MONETARY EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN COMPETITION CASEs, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820 (Aug. 4, 2003)

("situations can arise, for example, when significant aggregate consumer injury results from relatively
small individual injuries not justifying the cost of a private lawsuit, or when direct purchasers do not
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federal agencies,14 and state attorneys general-to shift their focus from
punishing individual offenders to using coordinated enforcement actions
to reform business practices. The newly adopted strategy, sometimes
organized in White House task forces,15 created an opportunity to design
compensation schemes for large classes of victims harmed by wealthy
corporate wrongdoers.
As set forth in Part III, rival settlements may, in fact, promise
advantages over global settlements monopolized by a single set of
attorneys. First, competition theoretically may mean more efficient
representation as defendants bargain with private and public attorneys
Second, rival
over who may best represent victims' interests.
settlements may offer more total compensation, particularly when public
and private actors have statutory authority to collect money from
different defendants. Finally, dueling representation promises more
compensation for different subgroups of victims in the settlement, as
public and private attorneys vie with each other to represent different
group interests in the overall settlement.
However, Part III also shows that, in their current form, settlement
rivalries may fall short of the goals of more effective representation and
compensation by: (1) threatening duplicative actions that proceed on
separate tracks without coordinated judicial oversight; (2) introducing
new uncertainty into litigation and settlement financing; and (3)
confusing unrepresented victims with separate, rival settlement offers.
In this regard, settlement rivalries among public and private actors share
some of the same advantages and disadvantages as rival state class
action settlements. Before Congress passed the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, which pushed many class actions into federal court,
commentators complained that attorneys for putative class members
competed in different state courts to certify class actions for overlapping
groups of people.' 6
sue").
14. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR

2009, at 11, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf#secl (observing SEC's
primary goals are to "take prompt action to halt the misconduct, sanction wrongdoers effectively, and,
where possible, return funds to harmed investors.").
15. Andrias, supra note 10. See also Adam S. Zimmerman, PresidentialSettlements, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 25-26), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-2414748.
16. Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (2000) (detailing
problems of waste in dueling class actions); Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 514, 516 (1996). Although competitive class actions still exist, the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) has reduced their number by permitting defendants to remove state class actions to federal
court with minimal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (granting federal jurisdiction over interstate class
actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and at least one plaintiff and one defendant
are citizens of different states). See also Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for
Preclusion, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053 (2013); Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum ShareholderLitigation,
2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 469, 469 (presenting empirical evidence that in litigation over corporate mergers,
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Part IV offers three reforms that tap into the theoretical advantages
and persistence of rival settlements, while ameliorating their downsides:
(1) reducing duplication by permitting a single court to formally or
informally coordinate review over dueling public and private
settlements; (2) reducing strategic behavior and uncertainty among
parties by calling for public actors to adopt the distribution guidelines
proposed by the American Law Institute in large-scale litigation; and (3)
streamlining notice and opt-out provisions to reduce victim confusion
and unintended waivers of rights.
II. THE RISE OF SETTLEMENT RIVALRIES
A. Settlement RivalriesDefined

In a settlement rivalry, public officials and private attorneys attempt
to establish a settlement fund with money from the same wrongdoer, on
behalf of the same beneficiaries, often run by same administrators, for
the same kinds of harm. Such cases may involve high profile
defendants, like Adelphia Communications,17 British Petroleum,18
Apple, 19 and Computer Associates,20 or high profile scandals, like
Bernard Madoff or Tom Petters-known as the "Minnesota Madoff,"
which is expressly excepted from CAFA, class counsel "regularly file identical claims in more than one
forum and then compete with each other for position in settling with defendants").
17. Adelphia paid $715 million in restitution to defrauded shareholders, shortly before filing for
bankruptcy, even though, under bankruptcy's "priority-rule," shareholders receive funds after creditors.
According to Adelphia's agreement with federal prosecutors, the Attorney General and SEC would
disburse funds to victims "in such forms and amounts [to be determined] in their sole discretion." Letter
from David Kelley, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, to Alan Vinegrad et. al., Counsel to
Adelphia 3 (Apr. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
18. British Petroleum paid over $53 million into a restitution fund for direct and indirect
purchasers of propane to settle criminal price fixing charges as part of a larger settlement with the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
United States v. B.P. Am. Inc., No. 07 CR 683 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007), available at
That settlement was
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/2007/oct/10-25-07bpameriac-dpa.pdf
reached on the heels of a private class action settlement for the same conduct.
19. Press Release, State Attorney General E-book Settlements, $69 Million Attorneys General
Settlement Provides Money Back for Certain E-book Purchases, (Oct. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/69-million-attomeys-general-settlement-provides-moneyback-for-certain-e-book-purchases-174552291.html; Complaint, Petru v. Apple, I1-CV-03892 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 9, 2011).
20. Computer Associates settled criminal securities violations by, among other things, agreeing
to set up a $225 million fund for victims. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004). The fund administrator in that case,
Kenneth R. Feinberg, struggled to determine how much, and how differently, to compensate claimants
in the second fund. United States v. Computer Assocs., Plan of Allocation for the Restitution Fund, 2
n.2 (June 2005) [hereinafter Computer Associates, Plan of Allocation] (describing disputed claims by
at
available
stock),
sellers
of
defendants'
and
holders,
purchasers,
http://www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/carfl plan.pdf.
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for his own multi-billion dollar Ponzi-scheme that spanned over a

decade.21

It should come as no surprise that American-style litigation-which
involves a federal system built on government factionalism, 22 and
talented, private entrepreneurial lawyers 23 -encourages rivalries. For
years, public and private actors commenced parallel actions against
corporate defendants. 24
Congress increasingly assigns federal
regulators, state attorneys general, and private attorneys competing
responsibilities for interpreting and enforcing federal law.25 Private
attorneys also frequently vie over the position of lead counsel in class
actions and other forms of mass litigation. 26
But settlement rivalries differ in that they typically involve cases
where public attorneys offer compensation to individuals though a
massive settlement-sometimes after private counsel separately
investigates, conducts discovery, and nears final settlement on behalf of
the same group of victims. 27 Public and private rivalries thus raise new
21. Anthony Lake, Tom Petters, The "Minnesota Madoff" Gets 50 Years Out of Potential 335
Years for $3.7 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FEDERAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE BLOG (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.federalcriminaldefenseblog.com/2010/04/tom-petters-the-minnesota-madoff-gets-50-yearsout-of-potential-335-years-for-3-7-billion-ponzi-scheme/.
22. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating To Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193,
2204 (2012) ("The working premise of separation of powers is that the divergent interests of different
government institutions will keep them at odds with each other."); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 2 (2d ed. 1998); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separationof Powers
Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1130 (2000).
23. See Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney
General:Perspectivesfrom an EmpiricalStudy of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 397
(1988) (asserting that the American concept of private attorneys who advance public law "celebrates the
power of attorneys to do good, to overcome structural obstacles to the vindication of legal rights, and
therefore to bring justice to those who may be priced out of the market").
24. See, e.g., Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfeld, The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 687 (1941) ("explor[ing] the possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to
fashion an effective means of group redress" to supplement administrative law enforcement); Sergio J.
Campos, Class Actions All the Way Down, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 20,22 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in SharedRegulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 22; Matthew C. Stephenson, Information
Acquisition and InstitutionalDesign, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1461-83 (2011) (examining interactions
of multiple agents as a mechanism for information gathering); Rose, supra note 10, at 2176.
26. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and DerivativeLitigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CH. L.
REV. 1, 115 (1991); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigation,79 FORD. L. REV. 1985 (2011) (describing contests between "lead" and "disabled" lawyers in
class actions and other forms of multidistrict litigation); Vanessa Blum, Breyer Doles Out Lead Counsel
Roles in HP Suits, THE RECORDER (Mar. 4, 2013) (describing battle for lead counsel in HP shareholder
litigation).
27. See Alison Frankel, Welcome to the MBS Party,SEC ... You're Only 3 Years Late, REUTERS
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/02/10/welcome-to-the-mbs-party-sec-youreonly-3-years-late/ (observing that agencies and federal prosecutors sued years after plaintiffs' firms
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risks for defendants-who no longer may rely on private class litigation
or bankruptcy to globally resolve claims for compensation-and
plaintiff attorneys, who face new risks and competition as they attempt
to recover their upfront investment in mass litigation.
Rival settlements between public and private actors take several
forms. Congress may create a rival settlement scheme, as it did when it
reopened the September 1I Victim Compensation Fund in 2010.28 That
fund followed a landmark $700 million private settlement between
thousands of rescue workers and the City of New York. It, like other
public settlements of its kind, requires private litigants to waive their
rights in private litigation in exchange for a public payment.3 0
Presidents may also forge rival settlements. 3 1 The BP disaster, for
example, produced two avenues of relief, litigation in federal district
court and an independent compensation fund established at the behest of
the President, pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act. 32 The result involved
ongoing jockeying between counsel who pushed for a global settlement
in federal court and those who sought relief before the Gulf Coast Claim
Facility. 33
But most rival settlements are produced by other executive branch
officers, who forgo criminal or civil trials in exchange for settlements
with corporate defendants that seek structural reforms and compensation
for large groups of victims like a class action. These actions include
those commenced by state attorneys general,3 4 federal prosecutors, 5 and
"sunk thousands of hours and millions of dollars into their [mortgage backed securities] cases").
28. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-347 (2010).
29. Mireya Navarro, Sept. 11 Workers Agree to Settle Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19,
2010, at Al.
30. See, e.g., September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66274
(Dec. 21, 2001) ("The Fund offers the eligible claimant an alternative to litigation."); United States
Dep't of Health Resources and Services Admin., National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
HRSA.GOv, http://www.hrsa.gov/Vaccinecompensation/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
31. Zimmerman, supra note 15 (documenting Presidential Settlements throughout United States
history that resolve mass compensation claims like class actions).
32. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico on April
20, 2010, 2011 WL 6817982 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011).
33. That rivalry culminated in a decision by Judge Charles J. Barbier-the federal judge
overseeing thousands of lawsuits lodged against British Petroleum (and others) for the Gulf Coast Oil
Spill-to pay fees for the lead attorneys in Multidistrict Litigation by deducting money from awards to
people (and accordingly their attorneys) who applied to the Gulf Coast Claim Facility, the no-fault
alternative to the litigation, then overseen by Special Master Kenneth R. Feinberg. John Schwartz,
Plaintiffs' Lawyers in a Bitter Dispute Over Fees in Gulf Oil Spill Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at
A30.
34. Lemos, supranote 7.
35. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 6, at 1411-14; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution,93 VA. L. REv. 853, 900 (2007) (collecting agreements and finding that of the $4.9 billion
sought by prosecutors against corporate defendants, 86% was not for fines, but for large civil
compensation awards).
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federal agencies.3 6 Such compensation funds increasingly rival class
actions and bankruptcies in their attempt to provide compensation on a
massive scale through a large compensation fund.
As such "executive branch" compensation funds increasingly mirror
multi-million dollar class action settlements, they themselves must
overcome similar challenges to ensure that victims receive notice,
compensation, and fair representation. Some use mass mailings, tollfree phone services, and "victim-witness coordinators" to alert victims
to their rights in large criminal, agency, or state attorney restitution
funds.37 While few detailed rules exist to notify or resolve claims
between multiple parties, the notice forms used in both public restitution
schemes and private class actions may be strikingly similar. They both
may require victims to give up rights to sue in civil litigation.38 In some
cases, the inattentive victim may not notice that a prosecutor, and not a
private plaintiff attorney, commenced the original action. 39
Large public settlements may also rely upon the same sophisticated
administrators used in the civil system to develop distribution plans for
potential victims. 40 Federal courts, for example, may refer complex
36. Gretchen Morgensen, Countrywide to Distribute Settlement to Its Clients, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2011, at BI (describing the unprecedented settlement struck between the Federal Trade Commission
and Countrywide Home Loan for excessive fees during the mortgage crisis); Press Release, Goldman
Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage Fraud (July 15,
2010), availableat http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm; Press Release, FTC Urges Consumers
to Cash Restitution Checks Mailed by Wachovia Bank (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/01 /fte-urges-consumers-cash-restitution-checksmailed-wachovia-bank (describing $150 million fund established by FTC and OCC settlement with
Wachovia Bank for victims of telemarketing fraud).
37. The Needfor IncreasedFraudEnforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant
Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., United States Dep't of Justice) ("Because some financial frauds involve the
victimization of hundreds of people, the Department also expends considerable resources finding the
victims in the first instance. The Department's many victim-witness coordinators and law enforcement
officials work tirelessly to help ensure that what money is recovered reaches the victims of the
crimes."), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdfl09-02-11 GlavinTestimony.pdf.
38. See, e.g., In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005)
(describing settlement requiring third party releases).
39. Compare,. e.g, Notice of Claims Process for Distribution of Restitution Fund (Jan. 2005)
(notice for the criminal
restitution fund in
Computer Associates), available at
http://www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/carflnot.pdf, with Proof of Claim and Release
(Dec. 2002), available at http://securities.stanford.edull010/CA98/ 2003919_rO6x_98CV04839.pdf
(notice for the civil class action settlement in Computer Associates).
40. For example, the United States Attorney and SEC picked Kenneth R. Feinberg, recently
dubbed by the Wall Street Journal as the "Special Master of America," to oversee the $225 million fund
for defrauded stockholders in Computer Associates. Ashby Jones, Spotlight on Ken Feinberg:Special
Master
of
America,
BLOGS.WSJ.COM
(Jan.
14,
2010,
11:06
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2010/01/14/spotlight-on-ken-feinberg-the-special-master-of-america.
Similarly, in 2002, former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer settled civil and criminal charges
under New York State's Martin Act with the nation's largest investment banks for over $1.4 billion.
Frances McGovern, a well-known scholar in the area of mass torts who has administered many multi-
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criminal restitution orders to magistrate judges and special masters,
who, in turn, may "require additional documentation or hear testimony"
from victims. 4 1 In cases where courts do not review the settlement
agreement at all, prosecutors, agencies, and state attorneys general still
may refer cases to a third party.
Finally, public restitution funds, like class actions, bankruptcies, and
other forms of complex private litigation, struggle to serve multiple
classes of victims who may have very different interests in the award.
After forty-nine state attorneys general unveiled a $25 billion settlement
with the nation's largest banks to provide mortgage relief to millions of
homeowners, 43 they also sought to reconcile very different interests.44
Those wrongfully forced out of their homes on the basis of forged or
"robo-signed" documents sought compensation from their former
mortgage servicers.4 5 Others, trapped in homes worth far less than the
value of their mortgages, sought refinancing arrangements.46 More
indirect victims, those living in regions hit hard by the mortgage
foreclosure crisis, hoped the settlement would finally stabilize housing
prices in their neighborhoods. The final settlement would offer
something for all of these parties. 47
billion dollar settlement funds, was appointed to oversee the distribution. See SEC v. Bear, Steams &
Co., Inc, 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(4)(6); United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp. 2d. 378, 384 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (referring sufficiency of $90 million in victim restitution to federal magistrate). See also United
States v. Salim, 287 F. Supp. 2d 250, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
42. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. B.P. Am. Inc., No. 07-CR-683,
13 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/2007/oct/10-2507bpameriac-dpa.pdf (calling for British Petroleum to appoint a "Third Party Administrator" to be
approved by the Department of Justice). See also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 3:09-cv-l 13-W, 6(B) (W.D.N.C. July 1, 2009) (requiring the appointment
of a Claims Administrator to oversee victim restitution fund to defrauded homebuyers).
43. Joseph Smith, First Take: Progress Report from the Monitor of the National Foreclosure
Settlement, OFFICE OF MORTGAGE

SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT,

2 (Aug. 29, 2012), available at

(The
htps://www.mortgageoversight.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ProgressReport08292012.pdf
banks participating in the settlement included Bank of America, CitiMortgage, Ally Financial, J.P.
Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo.).
44. Id.
45. Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Political Push Moves a Deal on Mortgages Inches
Closer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at BI; Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal is Done but Hold the
Applause, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at BUl.
46. Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Mortgage Plan Gives Billions to Homeowners, But
with Exceptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at Bl.
47. The bulk of the settlement, approximately $20 billion, went to one million American
homeowners who would have their mortgage debts reduced or their loans refinanced at a lower interest
rate. Another $1.5 billion was devoted to the 750,000 people who lost their homes to foreclosure
between 2008 and 201 1--each receiving checks between $1,500 and $2,000. Finally, regulators
earmarked more than half of the settlement to homeowners in two states-Florida and California-to
reflect the disproportionate number of loans that were delinquent or exceeded the value of the
underlying property in those states. Id. Banks also received millions in credits for foreclosing on homes
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Different public and private law standards for compensation
aggravate conflicts between victims. The Federal Trade Commission
may choose to compensate both direct and indirect victims of a business
practice that violates antitrust law,4 8 even when only direct victims may
recover in a private class action. 4 9 Under the "relation back doctrine,"
all assets involved in the crime become forfeitable assets as of the date
of the crime, which, in turn, may compensate all victims injured "as a
result of' the crime.5 0 But when that same defendant files-voluntarily
or involuntarily-for bankruptcy, a trustee must prioritize the division of
assets to very different parties, like secured and unsecured creditors. 5 1
Conflicts between victims, however, may pale in comparison to the
conflicts that victims experience with government attorneys themselves.
Politically ambitious attorneys general may prioritize a rapid resolution
and big headlines at the expense of victims' different interests in
compensation. 52 But even the most well-meaning prosecutors may seek
deals at odds with victims, to obtain information about other criminal
parties or to reduce the collateral impact of a large award on innocent
third parties, like employees or shareholders.5 3
more quickly to stabilize housing markets in distressed neighborhoods. Shaila Dewan & Jessica Silver
Greenberg, ForeclosureDeal Credits Banks for Routine Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at BI
(observing that banks can erase more than $2 billion of their obligation under the settlement by
"donating or demolishing abandoned houses" and another $1 million to help defaulted homeowners
move out).
48. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding the FTC may
recover the same relief on behalf of indirect consumers). Critics complained that the FTC distribution
distorted antitrust law by enlarging the class of victims who could obtain relief. See Roxane C. Busey,
Chair, American Bar Ass'n Section of Antitrust Law, Response to the Commission's Request for
Comment on the Remedial Use ofDisgorgement (Mar. 13, 2002); see also Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission, FTC Reaches Record Financial Settlement to Settle Charges of Price-Fixing in Generic
Drug Market (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/11 /mylanfin.htm (describing
dissenting views of Commissioner Thomas Leary as a "backdoor approach" to monetary recoveries
unavailable under antitrust law).
49. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (requiring that prosecutors seek restitution for certain crimes
whenever "an identifiable victim or victims" suffer any "physical injury or pecuniary loss").
51. Karen M. Gebbia, Debt and Crime: Inevitable Bedfellows. The Intersection of Fraud,
Bankruptcy andAsset Forfeiture,42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 525 (2012).
52. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, Eliot Spitzer and Christopher Christie, two prosecutor-turnedgovernors, sought to create massive restitution funds in connection with highly publicized corporate
misconduct. See Barbara Moses, The "Discovery" ofAnalysts Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L.
REv. 89, 99-105 (2004) (describing the evolution of the global settlement between the investment banks
and government actors and former New York Attorney Eliot Spitzer); See also SEC v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., Inc, 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (chastising the government in same settlement for
"tortured restructuring and embarrassing consequences" that resulted from the failure to identify
investor losses). See also Stephanie Saul, Bristol Meyers Seen Settling Case by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 2005 (describing terms of Chris Christie's $300 settlement with Bristol Meyers), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/06/business/06bristol.html.
53. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Op-Ed, Bailout Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A27 ("Think
of the effect on the community if these companies had been shuttered: employees would have lost their
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Historically, public and private attorneys occupied distinct roles in
enforcement actions. For public attorneys, compensation remained at
most a secondary goal to deterring misconduct. 54 For private attorneys,
the class action served both goals, 55 but when a settlement also involved
government lawyers, the class action provided the principal form of
compensation. Public regulators sought to ensure compliance with the
law and to send a message to other regulated entities; any compensation
or restitution flowed to injured parties under the procedural safeguards
that existed for the "coattail" class action.
This division of
responsibility, at least theoretically, minimized the public resources that
government lawyers devoted to compensation, while maximizing their
influence over decisions about law enforcement and deterrence.
But increasingly, executive actors have begun to forge settlements
that look like class actions, after private attorneys have already
commenced a class action. This is a result of two trends: (1) the
increasing impact of the victims' rights movement on public laws
requiring restitution, and (2) executive branch actors' evolving role in
the regulation of corporate behavior.
B. Settlement Rivalries Rise

The rise of settlement rivalries, as I have discussed elsewhere,56 is the
product of new developments in public law that have fundamentally
changed the role of federal prosecutors, agencies, and state attorneys
general.
First, victims' rights advocates and others successfully convinced
public officials to revise their traditional offender-based goals of
punishment and deterrence to include restitution for victims. For federal
prosecutors, the victim's rights movement made compensation for
victims an important criminal justice priority and pushed Congress to
adopt several federal statutes aimed at addressing the role of the victim

jobs, shareholders and pensioners would have lost their savings and countless people in need of hip and
knee replacement would have been out of luck.. . ."); Accountability, Transparency,and Unformity in
CorporateDeferred and Non-ProsecutionAgreements Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
andAdmin. Law, Il1 Cong. 93 (2009) (statement of former United States Attorney Charles Rosenberg)
("the consequences of corporate crime can touch a staggering number of citizens"), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdflRosenberg 090625.pdf.
54. SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that compensatory goals
remained secondary to interests of enforcement and that proceeds of disgorgement funds need not be
distributed to investors); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 336 (1980).
55. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General Is-and Why It
Matters, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142-55 (2005) (mapping overlapping public and private interests
served by class actions and other lawsuits).
56. See Zimmerman, supranote 6; Zimmerman & Jaros,supra note 6.
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in the criminal justice system.57 With each act, Congress encouraged
prosecutors to take a more forceful role in recovering victim
compensation.
Federal agencies' power to seek restitution, by contrast, flows from
their authority to seek injunctive relief in federal court-an outgrowth of
New Deal decisions that expanded their regulatory and compensatory
role. 8 But federal agencies only actively began seeking mass restitution
under that authority after 2002, also in response to growing calls for
*
59
victim -compensation.
Finally, state attorneys general, at common law, often lacked
authority to seek compensation directly for injured parties outside of
their "quasi-sovereign interests." 60
But Congress, expressly
acknowledging the limitations of class actions as a form of victim
compensation, expressly granted state attorneys general new authority to
recover funds for victims in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976.

Congress and state legislatures supplemented state attorney general
authority to recover compensation for injured consumers, home buyers,
and investors.6 1 But after the fallout from the 1998 Tobacco Settlement,
state attorneys general also made victim compensation a significant
component of their settlements with large corporate defendants.
As it happens, public officials started to focus more intently on
restitution just when they found themselves in a position to negotiate

57. Chief among these were the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims' Rights
and Restitution Act of 1990, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, and the Crime Victims'
Rights Act of 2004.
58. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938) (approving delegation of flexible
finings power to administrative agencies); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946)
(holding that wartime price administrator may seek restitution against landlords charging excessive
rents); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 337 (1960) (holding Secretary of Labor
was authorized to seek restitution against employers for lost wages). See also Zimmerman, supra note
6, at 520.
59. Adam S. Zimmerman, The CorrectiveJustice State, _5 J. TORT LAW 189, 209-211 (2014).
60. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
61. Congress, for example, has empowered state attorneys general to seek consumer redress from
activities ranging from unlawful fraudulent credit transactions to telemarketing services. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 1679h(c)(1) (authorizing suit for violations of federal law governing credit repair
organizations); id. § 1681s(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (credit reporting agencies); id. § 5712 (2006)
(pay-per-call services); id § 6103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (telemarketers). Many state statutes
specifically authorize the attorney general to sue as parens patriae to recover damages for citizens for an
even broader range of conduct. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.909 (West 2012) (authorizing parens patriae
actions for damages on behalf of Florida victims of unauthorized insurance transactions); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-21(c) (West 2000) (authorizing parens patriae actions on behalf of New Jersey victims
of bias crimes); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 3341 (2004) (authorizing parens patriae actions for damages
on behalf of Puerto Rico consumers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8.2-6 (2001) (authorizing parens patriae
actions for damages on behalf of Rhode Island victims of medical assistance fraud); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.080 (2010) (authorizing parens patriae actions for restitution on behalf of Washington victims of
consumer protection violations). See generally Lemos, supra note 7, at 496-97.
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generous compensation awards on behalf of large classes of victims. In
response to post-Enron corporate fraud scandals, prosecutors, agencies,
and state attorneys general adopted a "bold new prosecutorial mission" 62
to regulate corporate America by using the threat of indictment to
The result, as one
encourage sweeping institutional reforms.
practitioner complained, is a system that for all practical purposes offers
"two ways to settle a class action"--one with a "private attorney
general" and the other with the real "attorney general," herself. 63
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SETTLEMENT RIVALRIES

A. Rivalries 'Benefits

Settlement rivalries offer several theoretical advantages over global
settlements managed by a single firm or steering committee. First,
private and public actors bring different resources to the table. Before
the pleading stage, public actors enjoy more subpoena and coercive
power. 6 4 After the pleading stage, private actors can often devote more

resources to discovery. Rival actions also have more tools to recover
funds. Federal agencies, prosecutors, and state attorneys general may
have standing to seek funds against third parties that private plaintiffs
cannot; 65 public authorities may attach and collect funds from parties,
62. Garrett, supra note 35, at 858.
63. Nate Raymond, Plaintiffs Lawyers in Muni Bond Derivative MDL Object to UBS BidRigging
Settlement,
AMERICANLAWYER.COM
(May
11,
2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202493650539.
64. Unlike private lawyers, who must meet stiff pleading burdens before obtaining discovery,
federal agencies and prosecutors can monitor and discover bad acts before discovery using a range of
tools. For example, the SEC has long relied on a "Wells Process," whereby prospective defendants or
respondents are afforded an opportunity to submit a writing-essentially a brief-to the Commission
and its staff after the staffs investigation is completed, but before the staff has made a recommendation
to the Commission. See generally 17 C.F.R. §202.5(c). Wells submissions provide a way to ensure the
SEC possesses information related to an impending enforcement action and that defendants have an
opportunity to respond privately to an investigation. Paul S. Atkin et al., Evaluating the Mission: A
Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 8 FORDHAM. J. OF
CORP. & FIN. LAW 368, 378-83 (2008) (describing history and basis for Wells Submissions).
65. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that the EEOC can
recover damages and other relief on behalf of an employee who could not under a mandatory arbitration
agreement); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 7, at 642-43 (describing advantages enjoyed by states
attorney general in parens patriae litigation); Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A
Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-PartyLiability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2125, 2127-28 (2010) ("The Court's choice of reliance as the crucial element indicates the Court's
comfort with having different liability outcomes in Rule lOb-5 cases depending on whether the action is
an SEC enforcement or criminal prosecution (where reliance is not required) or private litigation (where
it is)."); Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 6 (describing powers enjoyed by prosecutors to pursue
restitution from third parties). Indeed, in a new article that comprehensively evaluates every SEC
settlement fund established between 2002 and 2013, Professor Urska Velikonja finds that, more than
half of the time, the SEC compensates investors for losses where a private lawsuit is either totally
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using criminal forfeiture laws that private plaintiffs cannot;66 or, in the
case of state attorneys general, government attorneys enjoy discretion to
pursue actions under either criminal or civil law. Private attorneys, by
contrast, may enjoy more private resources, financing, and incentives to
pursue corporate wrongdoing.6 7 In the same ways that private and
public actors have long complemented each other's efforts to deter
wrongdoing, so may their shared attempts to compensate people. 68
But the rivalry itself between public officials and private attorneys
also may offer advantages. Just as proponents of a governmentsponsored "public option" for health insurance argued that public
insurance plans would pressure private insurers to reduce premiums or
increase benefits, 69 one could imagine that government attorneys impose
similar incentives on private collective litigation when they provide a
public option for mass compensation. Information gathered about
individual claim values in one mass settlement may also inform values
in a second, supplemental settlement brokered by public attorneys. 70
Public and private compensation rivalries also may make an
individual's decision to opt out of a class action more meaningful.
unavailable or impractical. Velikonja, supra note 10, at 6-7. In other cases, third- party defendantsexecutives, the auditor, and investment banks-contributed more than $1.24 billion to SEC settlement
funds. Id. at 48.
66. Anthony Martucci, Advocating for Asset Forfeiture in the Post-Madof Era: Why the
Government, Not A Bankruptcy Trustee, Should Be Responsible for Recovering and Redistributing
Assets from Feeder Funds and Net Winners, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 599 (2012) (describing the
superior powers of federal prosecutors in collection under federal asset forfeiture laws).
67. Martin Pritinkin & Ezra Ross, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and
White Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 453 (2011) (arguing that billions in
government fines and restitution are often unrecovered by overburdened government attorneys).
68. For an illustrative example of the interplay between private and public counsel in
compensating large groups of victims hurt by a "feeder fund" to investments made by Bernard Madoff,
see In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 2013 WL 2450960, at *6-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013). There, after
private parties filed suit, defendants successfully stayed discovery under the heightened pleading
standards that govern securities litigation. Those barriers did not apply to then-Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo, who then launched a separate inquiry. His investigation, which involved the
production of over 11 million documents and 37 depositions, convinced the NYAG that the feeder fund
had fraudulently misled clients about Madoff for more than a decade, while knowing or strongly
suspecting that his was not a legitimate operation. However, "once the action was filed, the NYAG
effectively stopped doing anything at all." Id. at 7. Rather, private parties bore the lion share of the
discovery following the government investigation. According to the court, it was the potential cost of
dealing with the "multipronged attack from the Private Plaintiffs" that motivated the defendant to return
to settlement mode-"a mode from which it had walked away" after the NYAG filed its complaint. Id
at *9. See also Alison Frankel, N.Y AG Rebuffed in Clash with PrivateLawyers on Parallel Claims,
THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2013), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/05/13/ny-ag-rebuffed-in-clash-with-private-lawyers-with-parallel-claims/.
69. Richard H. Thaler, A Public Option Isn't a Curse, or a Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at
BU4.
70. See, e.g., Dell SEC v. Robert W. Davis, No. 1:10-cv-01464 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2011)
(approving SEC "Fair Fund" to automatically supplement funds from private class actions without
requiring separate claims for compensation).
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Some have questioned whether class actions-which generally require
claimants to affirmatively "opt out" of the settlement to preserve their
rights-actually offer a real option when claimants cannot afford to
litigate their cases individually. 7' A separate, concurrent, settlement
forged by a public attorney, by contrast, gives claimants another realistic
option outside of the class action settlement.7 2
More empowered claimants may also help courts and policymakers
identify whether a mass settlement, offered by the government or private
attorneys, offers real value. When courts certify a private class action
for settlement purposes, they often consider the rate at which people opt
out to determine whether the settlement is "fair, reasonable and
adequate." 73 Public funds, like the September 11 Victim Compensation
Fund or the Gulf Coast Compensation Fund, have been evaluated under
the same standard.74 In both cases, commentators have questioned
whether opt out rates provide a meaningful signal about the quality of a
settlement, given that people may decide to forgo participating in a
settlement for many reasons that have little to do with the fairness of a
large settlement fund.75 Rival settlements, however, may encourage
71. Compare Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 80 (2007) (gathering cases where courts "find an absence
or a small number of objectors to be powerful evidence that the proposed settlement is fair"), with In re
Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing as significant
that out of 5,000 notices "not a single objection. . . had been received"), and Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info.
Sys., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (taking judicial notice that, "despite a potential class of
thousands-if not millions-of owners" of Toshiba laptop computers, fewer than 30 objections were
filed in response to the "well-publicized announcement of this proposed Settlement Agreement").
72. Of course, this would be the case only if the public action truly is an "option" the victim can
choose, as opposed to something she's forced into. As set out infra, competing public and private
settlements also may create a race to the bottom or discourage class litigation entirely.
73. See, e.g., Deloach v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. 1:00CV01235, 2003 WL 23094907
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) (finding that small number of opt outs warranted higher-than-usual
compensation for counsel); In re Am. Bank Note Holographics, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (observing as
significant that out of 5,000 notices "not a single objection . .. had been received"); Shaw, 91 F. Supp.
2d at 961 (taking judicial notice that, "despite a potential class of thousands-if not millions-of
owners" of Toshiba laptop computers, fewer than 30 objections were filed in response to the "wellpublicized announcement of this proposed Settlement Agreement").
74. Many commentators considered the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund a success
because over 97% of all potential victims chose to join the fund. However, the fund would not have
successfully attracted families without separate, organized assistance from private lawyers providing
free services.

See, e.g., LLOYD DIXoN & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES

FROM
THE
9/11
ATTACKS
40
n.46
(Rand
2004),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND MG264.pdf
(detailing
the
success of the Fund but observing that over 1,100 attorneys provided free legal services to over 1,700
Fund applicants); Larry S. Stewart, No Victim Left Behind, TRIAL MAGAZINE, July 2004 (estimating the
value of free legal services at $350 million).
75. Leslie, supranote 71, at 80 (gathering cases where courts "find an absence or a small number
of objectors to be powerful evidence that the proposed settlement is fair"); ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:48 (4th ed. 2002) ("Courts have taken the position that
one indication of the fairness of a settlement is the lack of or small number of objections.").
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more meaningful settlement decisions by claimants, and accordingly,
send a clearer signal to courts that one settlement offers fairer outcomes.
Putting aside opt out rates, rival settlements may also help inform
public and private attorneys, as they negotiate awards and procedures in
lump-sum settlements. Information gathered about individual claim
values in one mass settlement may also inform values in a second,
supplemental settlement brokered by public attorneys. 76 For example,
less than two weeks before Merck publicly agreed to pay $950 million
to settle criminal and civil claims brought by the federal government
over the company's marketing of the painkiller Vioxx, the private
plaintiffs in a parallel Vioxx litigation filed a little-noticed emergency
motion to hold back a percentage of the government's award for their
own attorney fees. The Court found that there was a significant
"disconnect" between the private attorneys' work and the DOJ
settlement fund.n But a decent argument could be made that the private
bar's well-developed theory of liability, scientific evidence, and
individualized settlements in their own cases, likely contributed to the
size of the government's $950 million dollar award.78 In the BP
litigation, for example, the district court found that the lead plaintiffs in
the multidistrict litigation improved transparency, as well as potential
awards, in the rival government-created Gulf Coast Claim Facility.79
Such information may be particularly useful in settlement-only class
actions, where parties cannot easily identify rational settlement amounts
and there is little to no chance of litigation. o
76. See, e.g., Dell SEC v. Robert W. Davis, No. 1:10-cv-01464 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2011)
(approving SEC "Fair Fund" to automatically supplement funds from private class actions without
requiring separate claims for compensation).
77. In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1657, 2012 WL 10548, at *3 (E.D. La.
Jan. 3, 2012).
78. For example, the civil settlement in Zyprexa had already set aside over $43 million to
reimburse Medicare, Medicaid, and other welfare expenditures by the United States and 49 state
governments. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(describing parallel proceedings and government payouts). When the United States sought to recover
similar losses through a criminal restitution agreement with Eli Lily in another court, it was able to rely
on individualized private settlements to estimate its total award. Id. Notably, no formal procedures
existed to coordinate the criminal and civil actions. Instead, the district court charged by the Judicial
Panel for Multi-District Litigation to coordinate all federal civil cases against Eli Lily, informally
worked with the criminal court and other state courts to ensure the civil settlement was fair. See id. at
402-08 (describing informal coordination efforts).
79. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico on April
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 6817982 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011). For example, based on an
application of the plaintiffs' counsel in the private litigation, the court (1) ordered the GCCF to inform
claimants of their right to counsel, (2) to provide translated documents, and (3) to avoid communicating
directly with represented parties. The court also noted that the private litigants pressed for a more
"liberal causation standard" and for "punitive damages," which also enhanced the "settlement value of
compensatory claims" before the GCCF. Id. at 2-3.
80. Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, Gw. U. L. REv.
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Finally, when rivals compete, they improve the chances that smaller
groups of people within the large settlement receive adequate
representation. Private and public attorneys acting alone-albeit for
different reasons-have incentives to ensure that the total settlement is
large enough to effectively deter future violations of the law. But rival
settlements may also encourage attorneys to tailor their settlement
scheme to lure different stakeholders, with different interests, who may
not benefit as much from a single, global settlement.
In this regard, settlement rivalries among public and private actors
share some of the same advantages as rival class action settlements,
where attorneys for putative class members compete in different courts
to certify class actions for the same groups of people. Professor John
Coffee, for example, once recommended giving claimants more
opportunities to drop out of settlement funds they do not like, by
permitting rival plaintiff attorneys to organize competing class actions to
attract claimants unsatisfied with a class settlement.8' By way of
example, Coffee asks readers to imagine a class settlement where
members of an investor class are split into two groups. One group
receives 80% of their losses based on a securities fraud claim, while the
second group, who purchased stock at a later time, receives half as
much, only 40%:82
Assume that the court indicates that it would certify an opt-in class [for
the second group] if sufficient investors choose to opt-in. This message
is included in the notice mailed to the class in connection with the

original proposed settlement. In fact, only a handful of investors choose
to opt-out of this new class action ... . On this basis, the small number
of opt-outs in the face of a clear alternative might appropriately be taken
as an indication of implied consent by investors who purchased during
the latter period. In short, implied consent can be fairly implied when
there is a real choice, but not when the only choice is a Hobson's
choice. 83

By creating a rival class action for the second group of investors, so

the argument goes, one obtains the advantages of competition and
"increases the choices available to class members, without increasing
the risks of collusion." 84 Coffee's solution assumes that judges and
parties can coordinate rival efforts to notify potential claimants-which,
(forthcoming 2014), availableat http:// papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2243155.
81. John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in
RepresentativeLitigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 436-37 (2000).
82. Coffee posits that members of the second group may be willing to accept a lower average
award because the stock market already priced in much of the bad information by the time they
purchased their stock. Id. at 434.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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as set forth below, may not always be the case. But his larger point
remains: rival settlements may encourage public and private attorneys to
maximize the value of a large settlement for different subgroups of
victims whose interests may not always be served in a single action.8 5
Thus, rival settlements may, in theory, promise some advantages over
global settlements monopolized by a single set of attorneys. First, rival
settlements may offer more total compensation, particularly when public
and private actors have statutory authority to collect money from
different defendants. Second, competition theoretically offers more
efficient representation. Duel settlements arguably put downward
pressure on the cost of settlement; provide more information to public
and private attorneys negotiating over lump-sum awards; and offer
Finally, dueling
claimants more meaningful settlement options.
representation promises more compensation for different subgroups of
victims in the settlement-as public and private attorneys vie with each
other to represent different stakeholders' interests in the overall
settlement agreement.
B. Rivalries' Costs
But rival settlements raise different concerns, such as wasting
resources, discouraging attorneys from pursuing even meritorious class
They may also compensate
actions, and confusing claimants.
individuals according to different standards than the existing civil
system, creating undesirable opportunities for strategic "settlement
shopping."
First, rival settlements risk waste. When parties file two suits seeking
relief for the same wrong, they may use scarce public resources on
overlapping discovery, expert witnesses, and in very rare cases,
duplicative trials. 86 Preclusion rules in civil procedure, which ordinarily
bar subsequent lawsuits arising between the same parties arising out of
the same occurrence, do not apply with the same force to public and
private lawsuits.87 But aside from the traditional costs of duplicative
85. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining,Class Representation and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1993) (articulating a "mixed-model" of fairness that balances the utilitarian interest in
maximizing the total recovery for the class, against the defendants' costs structure and the need to
ensure that the settlement does not unfairly exclude individual members of the class).
86. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403, at 15 (2d
ed. 2013); Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that, for
that reason, preclusion doctrine "rests on the finality of judgments in the interest of the end of
litigation"); Mitchell v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 553 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1977) (without preclusion "the core
rationale of the rule of res judicata-repose-would cease to exist").
87. Spinelli v. Capital One Bank, USA, 2012 WL 3609028, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2012) ("a
state's sovereign interests cannot be compromised or impeded by a private settlement agreement");
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 308 (2002) (federal agencies' sovereign interests in
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litigation, resource concerns grow more serious when government
restitution funds compete with class action settlements, because both
class actions and government restitution funds may involve substantial
settlement costs.
Large settlement systems require expensive forms of notice, fairness
hearings, and private fees.88 And while government restitution funds do
not necessarily involve the private fees of a class action, they still
involve other administrative and opportunity costs. As government
attorneys expend limited resources to process claims, federal agencies,
state attorneys general, and prosecutors may even retain additional
private counsel to distribute publicly obtained awards.8 9 Large funds
also require state agents to devote limited government resources away
from other criminal and regulatory enforcement matters to mass
compensation. For criminal prosecutors, complex restitution schemes
can delay sentences, impede criminal investigations, and prevent the
prosecutor from obtaining cooperation from other criminal defendants. 90
For agencies, government funds may divert resources needed to develop
regulations, prevent new violations, or commence other enforcement
actions.
Competing public and private settlements also may create a race to
the bottom or discourage meritorious class litigation. Private attorneys
do not control the pace at which the courts entertain an action, and the
existence of another simultaneous suit on behalf of the same class before
government attorneys-sometimes without any judicial review-makes
the race to judgment very risky. Class counsel may decide that it is in
her own best interest to settle the action very quickly and for far less
than the value of the claim, just to guarantee that she is compensated for
her private investment in the dispute. Defendants, aware of the
substantial pressure to settle, may respond by "low-balling" class
counsel. And whatever gains come from the competition to prosecute
the defendant may be lost as defendants agree not to oppose class
providing compensation trump predispute resolution agreement); In re General Motors Corporation
Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down a settlement reached with state
attorneys general serving on a lead counsel committee with private lawyers that failed to include private
counsel in the deal).
88. See supraPart II.A.
89. Cf Roger Fairfax, The Delegation of the ProsecutionFunction to PrivateActors, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 411, 416-19 (2009) (describing the trend of "prosecution outsourcing" to private
attorneys); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE: SEC, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ENSURE IMPROVEMENTS IN PLANNED ENFORCEMENT DIVISION ACTIONS 24-29 (Aug.
2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07830.pdf (highlighting challenges, administrative
costs, and delays associated with SEC collection efforts). But see Velinkonja, supra note 10, at 30
(finding that "unlike in private litigation, the cost of distributing the fair fund is often borne by the
sanctioned firm" and not the SEC).
90. Zimmerman & Jaros,supranote 6, at 1418-19.
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counsel's application for a side deal that assures class counsel a hefty
fee, if class counsel agrees to the lowball offer.

Concurrent public restitution settlements also introduce new
uncertainty in mass litigation that "crowds out" even well-founded class
action litigation. When plaintiffs cannot package their claims together
as a single unit, they no longer receive the benefits of offering
defendants "total peace." 9 1 Moreover, public settlements may require
that the claimants waive rights to private litigation in exchange for the
distribution; 92 or they may foreclose private class action litigation. 93
With respect to the latter concern, courts increasingly refuse to certify
class actions when state attorneys general or federal agencies act to
address the same harm, on the grounds that the agency action is
ostensibly "superior" to a class settlement. 94 Given that public
settlement efforts are growing-in the past six years, the SEC alone
recovered ten times the amount of money than a decade ago9 5-such

awards increasingly raise concerns for private attorneys who risk
investing in even meritorious class action litigation without recovery. 96
91. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) ("From a practical
standpoint.. . achieving global peace is a valid, and valuable, incentive to class action settlements."); id.
at 313 n.44 ("[T]he settlement amount to which DeBeers has agreed must be based in large part on the
number of potential class members and on securing global peace."); D. Theodore Rave, Governing the
Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (2013) ("Defendants want peaceand they are often willing to pay for it. Plaintiffs therefore may stand to gain if they can package all of
their claims together and sell them to the defendant (i.e., settle) as a single unit; that is, they can charge a
premium for total peace.").
92. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (observing in massive EEOC
settlements that "[iut also goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery
by an individual"); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (establishing
escrow fund to prevent "double liability").
93. See, e.g., Gardner v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 00-2176, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1815, at
*26 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Magill, 698 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (dismissing purported class action because the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
"accorded present owners of the vehicles a remedy to secure a correction of the problem to their
vehicle").
94. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV.

§ 1779

(3d

ed. 2009) (collecting cases); Steven B. Malech & Robert E. Koosa, Government Action and the
Superiority Requirement: A PotentialBar to Private Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1419
(2005) (collecting cases); Lemos, supra note 7, at 505 (federal courts regularly permit parens patriae
actions to take the place of class actions, holding that the class mechanism is an "'inferior method of
adjudication' if the attorney general is pursuing a parens patriae action seeking the same sort of
remedies from the same defendant") (collecting cases).
95. Compare Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008) (observing
that between September 2002 and 2008, the SEC has collected "over $10 billion in disgorgement and
penalties, much of it for distribution to injured investors"), with Rory Flynn, SEC DistributionPlans in
Insider Trading Cases, 48 BUS. LAw. 107, 108 (1992) (finding SEC recovery between 1985 and 1992
totaled $1 billion).
96. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273 (2012); See also Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get There
from Here, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1809, 1813 (2000).
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Moreover, when rival settlements compensate different victims under
different standards, they encourage strategic "settlement shopping" and
complicate judicial review. Some victims may raise unnecessary
objections in civil litigation if they believe they have an edge with the
prosecutor, agency, or state attorney general. Strategic behavior may
also compromise criminal justice or regulatory goals; prosecutors may
not obtain evidence they need to move ahead with a criminal case,
particularly if victims believe they stand to benefit monetarily by
slowing down the criminal case. Different standards may also
complicate judges' efforts to coordinate review of public restitution and
civil damage settlements. Even where a single judge oversees the
distribution, multiple standards may unnecessarily complicate the
assessment of the overarching settlement between the corporate
defendant, prosecuting attorneys, regulatory bodies, plaintiffs' class
counsel, and victims.
In the Computer Associates case, for example, the federal prosecutor
appointed Kenneth Feinberg as a special master to distribute hundreds of
millions of dollars to diverse victims, after a private class action
settlement had already disbursed claim checks. Among other things,
Special Master Feinberg had to consider who would be eligible to
recover from the fund. Some were ineligible to recover in the civil
system because their claims were time-barred. Feinberg, however,
chose to allow parties with time-barred claims to recover from the
Moreover, payments in civil litigation
criminal restitution fund.
ordinarily reflect the litigation costs and risks associated with different
categories of claims.98 However, Feinberg chose to ignore these factors
in his distribution plan. 99 The fact that no rules existed then-or nowto guide a special master in any of these decisions created difficult
schisms among the eligible claimants.
Finally, rival settlements may confuse claimants. When public and
private attorneys simultaneously create large settlement schemes, the
settlement notices rarely alert claimants to the drawbacks and benefits of
97. Just as in civil litigation, however, the Special Master denied claims by those who only held
Computer Associate stock. Putting aside the fact only buyers and sellers are ordinarily entitled to
recover in a securities case, the Special Master also cited the difficult valuation questions raised by such
claims. ComputerAssociates, Plan of Allocation, supra note 20, at 2 n.2.
98. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 1.04 cmt. f [hereinafter ALI REPORT] (observing that in conventional and aggregate litigation
settlement values reflect "risk aversion, the ability to endure delay and other arbitrary factors");
MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.62 (2004) (observing factors in class action settlement
may include "probable outcome at trial," "probable time duration and cost," "probable resources and
ability of the parties to pay, collect or enforce settlement").
99. The Special Master's ultimate decision was well-grounded. While courts usually consider
such factors in civil class action settlements, crime victims, unlike plaintiffs, do not face the same costs
and litigation risks when prosecutors commence criminal actions against defendants.
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each respective fund. For example, in the bid-rigging settlement
described above, plaintiffs complained that the state attorney general
settlement fund failed to describe the basis for the allocation formula,
transactions not covered by the settlement, or the comparable remedies
available in the rival private class action. 00 Ultimately, the court
overseeing the private class action settlement reluctantly intervened'' to
review the states' settlement notices.and ensure that claimants received
adequate notice.102
In this way, the problems associated with large public settlement
funds mirror the concerns commentators once raised about rival class
action settlements.103 Rival public and private settlements may waste
resources, frustrate incentives to adequately litigate even meritorious
collective actions, and finally, may confuse the very claimants they
compete to serve. But there are some significant differences between
rival class actions and rival public and private settlements. First, unlike
rival state or federal class actions, public funds do not present the same
risk that plaintiffs may unwittingly waive their rights. Many public
actors only have power to form opt in settlements, where, unlike most
class actions, the claimants only forfeit the right to litigate when they
affirmatively decide to participate in the public settlement. So while
public settlements may entice more people away from class action
settlement fund, that risk may not be great.
Moreover, public actors involved in rival public settlements have no
independent financial stake in the action, unlike their private
counterparts in civil litigation. Congress has expressly adopted policies
encouraging government lawyers to intervene in class action settlements
to ensure the settlements are fair.' 04 In the same way, with appropriate
100. Class Plaintiff's Motion to Seek Relief Related to Select State Attorney General's Notice
Packet, In re Municipal Antitrust Settlement, MDL. No. 1950 (June 13, 2011) (on file with author).
101. Hinds Cnty., Miss. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("However pure the intentions of the Settling States may[]be, the Court must ensure that potential class
members receive notice of the State Agreement that conveys 'objective, neutral information' about the
nature of the claims pending before this Court, the potential remedies available, and the consequences of
electing to opt out of the putative class via the State Agreement release.").
102. Even public compensatory funds that follow class action settlements may confuse claimants.
The Computer Associates settlement between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Department of Justice strikingly mirrors notice issued to claimants as part of a private class action years
earlier. Compare, e.g., Notice of Claims Process for Distribution of Restitution Fund (Jan. 2005) (notice
for
the
criminal
restitution
fund
in
Computer
Associates),
available
at
http://www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/carflnot.pdf, with Proof of Claim and Release
(Dec. 2002), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/l010/CA98/ 2003919_r06x_98CV04839.pdf
(notice for tne civil class action settlement in ComputerAssociates).
103. Wasserman, supra note 6, at 462-63 (detailing problems of waste in dueling class actions);
Miller,supra note 6, at 516.
104. Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, for example, class counsel must distribute
copies of any class action notice to the DOJ and all fifty state Attorneys General Offices. The DOJ or
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reforms, perhaps rival settlements could provide another way for public
attorneys to offer an "extra layer of security for the plaintiffs" and
ensure that abusive settlements are not approved without "a critical
-

review.

0105

IV. IMPROVING THE SETTLEMENT RIVALRY

In light of the potential costs of settlement rivalries, many argue that
public restitution funds should strive to complement-and not compete
with-large private settlements.' 06 In other articles, I have argued that
government actors should devote their limited resources to victim
compensation only in those cases where there are legal or practical
obstacles to a civil class action. When many different state laws apply
to a business that commits nationwide fraud, attorneys may not be able
to certify a class action.'0 7 In contrast, a federal agency or prosecutor
may be able to provide compensation to a large and diverse group of
people under a uniform federal criminal restitution law. 08 Employees
of a target company may avoid lawsuits under "wage and hour" laws out
of a fear of losing their jobs.1 09 In such cases, prosecutors or state
attorneys general may find that the interest in collectively compensating
the state attorney general then may intervene to ensure greater transparency and fairness in the
settlement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (Supp. V 2005).
105. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34; see also 151
Cong. Rec. S450 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (explaining government watchdog
provisions in CAFA); 147 Cong. Rec. 22740 (2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (same).
106. Professor Winship, for example, proposes that the SEC prioritize Fair Funds when, among
other things, defrauded investors have no private legal remedy. See, e.g., Winship, supra note 7, at
1139-40; Black, supra note 7, at 318 (describing the Fair Fund provision and the SEC's new role in
investor compensation).
107. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that claims are not manageable if they are to be adjudicated under the laws of the
fifty states and multiple territories); Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2000) (observing that
variations in the law "may swamp any common issues and defeat predominance" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743-46 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class
action certification because of differences in state law).
108. Such a determination may raise federalism concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper.
For almost 20 years, class action scholars have debated the merits of a single federal law to permit
parties to bring class action claims. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT

§

6.01 cmt. a, at 398-99 (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 5, 1993) (explaining desirability of applying law of
single state to particular issue that is common to all claims); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex
Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (1996); Simon C. Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation
Project: Commencing the NationalDebate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843 (1994). It is worth considering whether
competing concerns of efficient restitution may, in some cases, override such federalism concerns.
109. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) ("[fat needs no argument
to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to
accept substandard conditions."); Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low Wage Workers in the
Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor StandardsAct and the Under
Enforcement ofMinimum LaborStandards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1326-28 (2008).
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victims is still warranted.
But settlement rivalries offer some significant benefits in terms of
settlement value, information, and representation. And, as a practical
matter, settlement rivalries will continue into the indefinite future,
particularly given the difficulty of imposing a single set of procedures
on public actors operating in a range of different jurisdictions and
settings-federal and state, judicial and administrative, and civil and
criminal. To be sure, those benefits will vary depending on the setting.
Rivalries involving large value claims raise arguably more concerns
than rivalries involving small value claims.
Rivalries between
bankruptcy trustees and government attorneys over fixed sums of money
to compensate different victims raise more concerns than rivalries
between government and class action attorneys over nonfixed sumswhere an agency action against third parties supplements available
assets to compensate the same victims. Rivalries that purportedly
"hijack" claims for compensation at the eleventh hour differ from
rivalries where both public and private attorneys openly and
concurrently develop parallel litigation. But all such rivalries raise
questions about how best to coordinate similar compensation schemes,
inform likely stakeholders in the settlement, and divide respective
awards.
Accordingly, this Part explores three reforms that build on existing
practice by courts and parties to tap the theoretical advantages and
persistence of rival settlements, while ameliorating their downsides.
First, courts may reduce uncertainty by formally or informally
coordinating review over dueling public and private settlements.
Second, public actors can reduce strategic behavior among parties by
adopting the distribution guidelines proposed by the American Law
Institute in large settlements to consistently balance victims competing
interests. Finally, courts may use existing authority under the federal
rules to reduce confusion or unintended waivers by policing rival notice
and opt-out provisions between class action and public settlements.
A. Coordination
With a few exceptions, government actors generally do not attempt to
coordinate their actions with private litigation.
There are good
arguments for this. After all, agencies need discretion to determine
when to enforce their own regulations. Constitutional and institutional
concerns may limit prosecutors' ability to consolidate criminal cases
into the same court as parallel civil cases. Many criminal cases against
corporations involve individual criminal defendants whose
constitutional rights limit the prosecutors' ability to charge in the same
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jurisdiction as a private lawsuit.o Moreover, United States Attorney
offices in different jurisdictions have different demands and different
case loads. And prosecutors generally have discretion to allocate
resources from office to office in light of their disparate needs.
However, when government actors settle and try to compensate large
groups of victims, the failure to attempt any coordination with large
private settlements raises special problems. A parallel government
settlement may crowd out needed private compensation, frustrate
finality and peace ordinarily sought in other forms of representative
litigation, and confuse victims.
An amendment to the rules governing multidistrict litigation could
allow the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) to select a
single federal judge to coordinate and oversee both a government
restitution fund and the pretrial phases of related federal lawsuits. The
JPML generally certifies an action for multidistrict litigation on a
petition from either plaintiffs or defendants when parties bring lawsuits
in many different courts. The JPML has the expertise to evaluate
whether a case is large and complex enough to warrant pretrial
coordination.'
Not all government restitution funds, on their face, will easily fit
within the JPML framework. As discussed above, constitutional and
institutional concerns may limit a federal prosecutor's ability to shift a
criminal case to another court."12 Other constitutional barriers may limit
the ability to hail state attorneys general into a single federal forum for
violations of state law. But when state attorneys general or prosecutors
file in federal court first, an amendment to the JPML could allow courts
to consolidate parallel class action litigation in the federal court that
handles the criminal, administrative, or attorney general action. A
centralized mechanism to coordinate actions would save resources and
ensure that criminal and civil class action settlements do not under110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (affording defendants right to trial in the state or district where the
"crime [was] committed"). See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) (limiting prosecution
to the district where alleged money laundering took place). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a defendant can move for a change of venue to avoid prejudice in the district that would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of
justice. Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964).
111. See Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview ofMultidistrictLitigation Rules at the
State and FederalLevel, 26 REv. LITIG. 47, 49 n.3 (2007) (demonstrating the extent to which the MDL
statute has been instrumental in disposing of complex cases). The MDL Panel maintains detailed
statistical summaries of its activities. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION,
(2007),
available
at
OF
MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS

According to
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/GeneralInfo/Statistics/Statistical Analysis 2007.pdf.
calculations current through September 30, 2007, there have been 265,269 actions subjected to MDL
proceedings since the MDL Panel's inception in 1968. Id.
112. See supra note I10 and accompanying text.
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compensate victims. A single federal court would conduct hearings to
assess the adequacy of individual awards from two different settlements,
coordinate notice to absent parties, and ensure that private attorneys
receive appropriate attorneys fees based on their coordinated efforts
with government attorneys to compensate victims.
When private plaintiffs file before the government attorneys,
coordination issues in a single federal court become more complicated.
Consolidation could still take place, but it would require consent of
individual criminal defendants and government attorneys. Individual
criminal defendants could raise meritorious objections to transferring
venue. Moreover, prosecutors may have institutional and practical
reasons to avoid splitting a case across jurisdictions. Finally, the
sovereign interests of state attorneys general deserve respect when their
claims sound in state law.
But even in cases that proceed on separate tracks, courts may
informally coordinate actions across federal and state lines. Such
coordination is consistent with judicial efforts to informally coordinate
efforts in complex actions between state and federal court.11 3 In such
cases, government attorneys could be obliged to produce information to
the judge overseeing the civil case, including the names of victims
scheduled to receive restitution, the basis for the awards, and any other
related fines or money awarded to government entities in the public
proceeding." 4 Such efforts also create opportunities for government
attorneys and private lawyers to determine whether to consolidate
settlement funds through a single scheme.
Such efforts have already begun-albeit on an ad hoc basis-between
private and public attorneys in bankruptcy and criminal proceedings, as
well as in antitrust cases, where state attorneys general frequently
establish massive settlement funds with defendants under federal law.
For example, Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York and
Stuart Bernstein, the Chief Bankruptcy Judge, recently approved a
coordination agreement between the United States Attorney and the
assigned bankruptcy trustee that centralized the distribution of artwork
and other assets seized by the federal prosecutor in a civil bankruptcy

113. Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crises: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005
UTAH L. REv. 863, 913-15 (2005) (observing that "many state and federal judges meet and form
networked responses" to the challenges of complex litigation); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial
Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689,
1690-91 (1992) (same).
114. Such procedures are common when different plaintiff attorneys commence separate actions
in different jurisdictions. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, § 22.2 ("Courts routinely
order counsel to disclose, on an ongoing basis past, and pending related cases in state and federal courts
and to report on their status and results.").
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proceeding. 5 Similarly, after Eli Lily reached a $1.2 billion settlement
with 30,000 plaintiffs for side effects associated with its antipsychotic
drug, Zyprexa," 6 federal prosecutors launched a separate criminal case
to recover $1.4 billion in restitution.'" 7 Both actions sought overlapping
monetary damages against the same defendant, for the same conduct.
Although no formal procedures existed to coordinate the criminal and
state court civil actions," 8 Judge Jack B. Weinstein worked informally
with the criminal court and other state courts to ensure the civil
settlement was fair.' 19 Finally, in the Apple e-book settlement, plaintiff
attorneys worked with state attorneys general to approve a centralized
settlement mechanism for consumers.120
B. Notice
Even when courts cannot coordinate mass settlements, they can still
take steps to ensure that rival settlements do not confuse potential
claimants. Even before certification, district courts may, pursuant to
Rule 23(d), regulate communications by parties and their counsel with
putative class members.121 When courts police rival settlement notices,
courts can both reduce the chance of confusion, as well as promote more
meaningful settlement decisions by claimants.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, given the potential for
abuse or confusion, a district court has "both the duty and the broad
authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate
115. See Coordination Agreement in United States v. Marc Drier, 09-CR-85 (2009); see also In re
Marc Drier, 08-BR-1505 1(2009) (Dec. 12, 2009) (on file with author).
116. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Company, Lilly and Plaintiffs' Attorneys Enter into Agreements to
Settle
Zyprexa
Products
Liability
Litigation
(Jan
4.
2007),
available
at
http://newsroom.lilly.com/ReleaseDetail.cfin?ReleaselD-224308.
117. In January 2009, Lilly pled guilty in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to federal criminal
charges of selling misbranded drugs into interstate commerce. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Company,
Lilly Resolves Investigations of Past Zyprexa Marketing and Promotional Practices (Jan. 15, 2009),
available at http://newsroom.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfin?ReleaselD-359242.
118. The civil settlement in Zyprexa had already set aside over $43 million to reimburse
Medicare, Medicaid, and other welfare expenditures by the United States and 49 state governments. See
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing parallel
proceedings and government payouts). However, the United States sought to recover similar losses
through a criminal restitution agreement with Eli Lily in another court. Id.
119. See id. at 402-08 (describing informal coordination efforts).
120. Alison Frankel, Are Publishers Using State AG's to Undermine the E-books' Class Action,
THOMSON REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2012 (statement by lead counsel observing that "[tihey want to work with
us," he said. "We're trying to come up with a cooperative joint prosecution arrangement with a lead
counsel committee that would include both AGs and class counsel."), available at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/04April/Arepublishers usingstateAGs to_underminee-booksclass action_/.
121. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 499 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In
re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 224 F.R.D. 555, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.",122 Moreover, a
court's obligation protect the integrity of a potential class settlement is
"not limited only to those communications that mislead or otherwise
threaten to create confusion and to influence the threshold decision
whether to remain in the class." 23 The Third Circuit has made clear that
communications that "seek or threaten to influence the choice of
remedies are . . . within a district court's discretion to regulate-" 2 4
In one case, for example, class counsel successfully petitioned a
district court to review notices issued by a state attorney general
settlement that would have prevented participants from collecting
money from the defendant national banks in a parallel class action.125
The court rejected state attorneys general claims that the court could not
interfere with their sovereign interests in the final settlement terms. The
court questioned whether sovereign immunity presented any obstacle
"when the state merely asserts the personal claims of its citizens."l 26
Just "because a defendant also has engaged in third party negotiations
with a sovereign state," does not prevent the court from regulating
communications with class members.' 27 However "pure the intentions
of the Settling States may be," the court felt obliged to review notices
from the multistate settlement to ensure it contained "objective, neutral
information" about the nature of the private settlement, the potential
remedies available, and the consequences of electing to opt out of the
putative class. 128
Reforming notice requirements may be less necessary in securities
class actions, where the PLSRA already strictly regulates disclosure and
the comparative benefits of settlement. However, in many cases, some
centralized form of notice between rival settlements may reduce the
confusion and distortion that result when public and private attorneys
battle over claimants. Coordinated notice may, in some cases, approach
Coffee's goals for rival settlements-that "one obtains the advantages of
competition and increases the choices available to class members,
without increasing the risks of collusion." 29

122. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981). See also Erhardt v. Prudential Grp. Inc.,
629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is the responsibility of the court ... to safeguard [class members]
from unauthorized, misleading communications from the parties or their counsel.").
123. Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 224 F.R.D. at 569.
124. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 683 (3d Cir. 1988).
125. Hinds Cnty., Miss. v. Wachovia BankN.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Coffee, supra note 81, at 434.
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C. Distribution Guidelines

Finally, government actors should consider using discretion in large
settlements to divide awards according to what victims would be entitled
to recover in civil litigation or bankruptcy. Compensating victims
consistent with civil settlement awards may reduce the costs associated
with coordinating civil, administrative, and criminal actions involving
the same activity; minimize strategic behavior between the parties; and
reduce the chances for inconsistent and arbitrary distribution schemes.
As set out above, when public restitution funds and civil class actions
compensate different victims under different standards, they risk
promoting strategic behavior and complicating judicial review. Even
when a single judge oversees the distribution, multiple standards may
unnecessarily complicate the assessment of the overarching settlement
between the corporate defendant, the prosecuting attorneys, agencies,
plaintiffs' class counsel, and victims. Moreover, judges and prosecutors
may struggle to apply standards rooted in something other than victims'
civil losses. Distributing criminal restitution funds based on need, for
example, may require difficult valuation decisions, more evidentiary
support, and additional administrative cost. Such distributions may also
permit prosecutors and judges too much discretion to make subjective
distribution decisions.1 30 An equality-based standard, one that pays
everyone the same amount, may be easy to administer. However, it may
not be just-particularly when victims are harmed in different ways.
Distributions involving insolvent parties may frustrate expectations
developed in and through the civil bankruptcy system.
In contrast, standards rooted in the civil litigation system more
legitimately track existing agency and state criminal restitution laws.' 3 1
Criminal restitution awards already require that prosecutors use concepts
familiar to civil litigation. Criminal restitution statutes, for example,
require that the defendant "proximately cause" the victim's harm.132
State attorneys general must already compensate victims under federal
antitrust laws consistent with their losses. A standard that tracks civil
settlements, minimizes strategic behavior, reduces possibility for error
and discretion, and accounts for differences in harm based on wellestablished guidelines seems consistent with existing victim restitution
laws.

130. Need-based standards may also be subject to abuse, as certain stakeholders, with more vocal
and powerful advocates, may push for awards that compensate certain needs over others.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (stating that victims shall only receive "[t]he right to full and timely
restitution as provided in law") (emphasis added).
132. Paroline v. United States, 572 U. S. _(2014) (criminal restitution is proper "only to the extent
the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses").
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Public restitution funds, as a result, could consider the American Law
Institute's guidelines for distributing awards in complex civil actions.
The ALI Report reflects the combined work of class action scholars,
litigants, and judges. Some courts have already relied upon draft
versions of the ALI Report to make difficult distribution decisions in
complex distribution schemes-including the landmark $1.5 billion
settlement forged by former New York State Attorney General, Elliot
Spitzer, and the nation's largest investment banks.' 33 The ALI Report
identifies, among other things, a set of principles to govern distribution
rules in class actions.
According to the ALI Guidelines, judges, administrators, and lawyers
should attempt to distribute awards according to principles of "vertical
equity," "horizontal equity," and "rough justice."l 3 4 That is, parties
should be compensated (1) according to the losses they may recover in
civil litigation; (2) consistent with similarly situated parties; but (3)
mindful of the practical limitations of administering a complex
compensation scheme.
Notably, the ALI Report is not a panacea for the many complex
issues that confront distributions in public restitution schemes. The ALI
guidelines do not address the difficult questions raised when federal law
promises to pay according to different standards than state law, or when
federal law follows different statutes of limitations. There may be little
benefit to evaluating the available claims under state law when federal
agencies or prosecutors operate under different statutory authority.'3 5 It
may also seem strange for prosecutors to include another common
feature mentioned in the ALI Report, litigation risks and costs, in
settlement calculations. No such costs exist for victims who make
claims to a criminal restitution fund. Accordingly, government lawyers
must balance broader law enforcement policies against the potential
coordination problems that may result when public restitution conflicts
with private legal remedies. While some of these questions fall outside
the scope of this paper, the ALI guidelines provide a starting point for
addressing the distributional questions raised here.

133. SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., Inc, 626 F. Supp. 2d 402,420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
134. See, e.g., Au REPORT, supra note 98, at § 1.04 cmt. f (observing that large compensation
funds implicate values of merit, equality, and "rough justice . .. where bargaining allows risk aversion,
the ability to endure delay and other arbitrary factors to affect claim values").
135. In the context of civil class actions, some scholars have raised just these federalism concerns
when a class action attempts to compensate victims according to a single state's law or federal common
law. Kramer, supra note 108, at 549; Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 2001, 2027 (2008).
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V. CONCLUSION

Mass settlement rivalries form a part of a growing global
phenomenon. The new model for mass settlements in the United States
and abroad involves many different players-class action lawyers,
agencies, prosecutors, nonprofits, and other institutions-all vying to
prosecute the same defendant, for the same conduct, and with power to
compensate victims on a massive scale. As set forth above, United
States litigation increasingly relies on state attorneys general, federal
prosecutors, agencies, and legislative compensation funds to compensate
victims in ways that look like class actions. Institutional players, like
large mutual funds and state retirement systems, relying on changes to
United States securities laws in the 1990s, have also taken a larger
leadership role in class action lawsuits.' 36 It should come as no surprise
that the end result increasingly produces rival funds, each seeking to
provide fair and efficient compensation for victims.
The same is true outside the United States. Just as the United
Kingdom amended its class action procedures, it also has clarified and
expanded the power of its public authority to seek consumer redress
under the 2010 Financial Services Act. 137 As Sweden, Norway, and
Denmark adopted class action procedures over the last decade, they also
expanded the authority of state agencies, consumer associations, and
other nongovernmental organizations to bring "representative actions"
on behalf of victims.' 38
Although this Article has focused on the problems rivalries present
for compensatory justice, the rise of settlement rivalries raises a host of
new questions for those interested in the overlapping role public and
private law plays in deterring bad behavior, improving compensation,
and punishing unlawful misconduct: What is the best way to
comprehensively compensate victims? Is it fair for prosecutors or
agencies, whose primary aim has generally been associated with
criminal punishment or regulation, to coordinate or compete with private
136. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
provides that the lead plaintiff-the class member with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position,
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006)-shall select and retain counsel to represent the class. 15
U.S.C. § 77z (a)(3)(B)(v). David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension FundActivism
In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (2010) (comprehensively
studying public and private institutions after the passage of the PLSRA).
137. Christopher Hodges, Developments in Collective Redress in the European Union and United
Kingdom,
5-6
(2010),
available
at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/1010%20Class%20Actions%20UK%
202010%2OReport.pdf.
138. See, e.g., Swedish Group Proceedings Act § 5; Norwegian Dispute Act, Ch. 35, § 35-3(l)(b);
Robert Gaudet, Earth to Brussels: Lessons Learnedfrom Swedish, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian Class
Actions, White Paper (July 14, 2008).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1

414

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

attorneys who seek to compensate victims? In those countries with
federal systems, like the United States, how should the federal
authorities coordinate with states bodies or private actors to promote
optimal deterrence?
But settlement rivalries perhaps raise the greatest challenges for
judges charged with overseeing different players, each with different
state, institutional, or personal interests in a final resolution. Judges
increasingly must determine how to coordinate or consolidate such
cases, if at all, with little guidance. No consistent standard of judicial
review exists to review settlements brokered by other players in
government. In a world where courts must reconcile competing
interests of victims, states, agencies, and federal authorities, with
different civil, regulatory, and criminal enforcement obligations, courts
need guidelines for determining what weight to give each decision
maker in settlement.
This Article takes a very small step towards raising some of those
questions and suggesting a few possible answers-considering ways
courts might build on existing solutions on the ground to improve
coordination, notice, and distribution in rival settlements. But those
proposals arise within a broader inquiry: as civil, criminal, and
administrative actions increasingly overlap, what do we want and expect
from our courts? Professor Chayes long ago argued that the growth of
civil rights and other public litigation placed increasing pressure on
courts to adopt an increasingly public law perspective-taking on more
of a "legislative" than "adjudicative" approach to large lawsuits.139
Since that time, commentators have alternatively described courts as
"managers," actively overseeing and brokering settlement discussions
with the assistance of special masters, or distant overseers of enormous
business mergers, where the core judicial function involved is simply
"blessing" the transaction.140 But, as public and private actors
increasingly take on overlapping roles, before the same judges, on a
global scale, courts may have to adopt yet another model to balance the
interests of individual and collective justice in mass litigation.

139. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
140. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model ofAdjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
371 (2001) (class action settlements as "transactions"); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924 (2000) (describing the
"managerial" approach adopted by the Manual for Complex litigation).
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